

## *From the Editor*

Since 1922, *Military Review* has had several formats and designs. The current layout took form in the mid-1980s. Since then, the world has undergone many changes: the Soviet Union's demise, the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf war, operations in the Balkans, and most recently, operations against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. To meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment, the Army is developing the Objective Force. Similarly, *Military Review* will be redesigning its format to become a better forum for discussing the art and science of operational and tactical warfighting. To that end, we are soliciting suggestions to improve the U.S. Army's professional journal. Send recommendations to the managing editor at <milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil>.

In this issue, *Military Review* presents two sections: officership and effects-based operations. Officership—the office, duties, and obligations of a commissioned officer—is a subject of growing interest. In “Officership,” Colonel (Retired) Don Snider provides a framework for discussing officership and explains why its study is important. In “The Officer as Warfighter,” Majors Paul Yingling and John Nagl consider officers' warfighting dimension and officers' obligation to serve as ethical role models. In “The Officer as Servant,” Major Suzanne Nielson examines officers as servants to the Nation and as members of a profession.

Effects-based operations is another topic of increasing interest. To achieve a desired effect against an enemy force, commanders have used the doctrinal construct of task, purpose, and intent to provide subordinate commanders direction and guidance in ambiguous or problematic situations. Some commanders argue that current doctrine does not incorporate commander's intent sufficiently into the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders to allow them to act with confidence and decision. Major General James Dubik argues in “Effects-Based Decisions and Actions” that desired effects against the enemy should be the cornerstone of a subordinate commander's decisionmaking process rather than the current collection of task, purpose, and commander's intent. In “The New DOCC,” General Burwell B. Bell leads a group of authors in relating how III Corps is transforming its deep operations coordination cell to plan and attack enemy targets more effectively.

In other articles, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Lester W. Grau and Major James H. Adams III consider the feasibility of helicopter aerial combat in “Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat.” In “Strategy Revisited,” Major Isaiah Wilson III cautions against what appears to be the current practice of using actual or proposed military capabilities to formulate national security strategy. In “The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,” Lieutenant General (Retired) G. A. Crocker reflects on what makes a successful executive officer. Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, reviews Egypt's successful deception operations that preceded the Yom Kippur War in “The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warning.” As always, *Military Review* remains committed to publishing the best in contemporary military thinking. Let us know how we can do better.

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